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Abstract. We propose that an active takeover market provides incentives by offering
acquisition opportunities to successful managers. This allows firms to reduce performance-
based compensation and can rationalize loss-making acquisitions. When choosing its ac-
quisition policy and the quality of its board, each firm ignores the adverse effect on other
firms’ acquisition opportunities and takeover threat. As a result, the takeover market is
not sufficiently liquid and too few takeovers occur. Furthermore, liquidity in the takeover
and managerial labour markets are inversely related. When poaching managers becomes
more profitable, firms invest more in board quality which in turn reduces the incidence of
takeovers.
JEL Classification: G34
1. Introduction
An active takeover market is commonly considered to create value by redeploying corporate
assets. A plethora of empirical studies documents that target shareholders as well as target
and acquiring shareholders taken together benefit from takeovers ?. Moreover, an active
market for corporate control also affects managerial behaviour. In particular, the threat of
a takeover is seen to discipline incumbent managers, thereby reducing agency costs (??).1
This paper takes a new look at the incentive implications of takeovers. While extant
theoretical and empirical work emphasizes the risk of being a target, we draw attention
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1 However, the literature also points out potential inefficiencies of takeover threats. For
instance, ? and ? argue that takeover pressure can lead to distorted investment decisions.
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to the flip side, namely, the prospect of acquiring another firm. We posit that the market
for corporate control shapes managerial incentives through two channels: the takeover
threat and the acquisition opportunity. Taking both these sides into account, we derive
the optimal acquisition policy and level of board quality in a single-firm setting. We also
analyse how the firms’ governance choices interact with the liquidity in both the takeover
and managerial labor markets.
Specifically, we consider a two-period moral hazard model in which a firm hires a man-
ager whose ability is unknown to all parties. First-period performance is a function of
both managerial effort and ability. Second-period performance depends only on ability,
and dismissing an incompetent manager increases expected second-period profits. A man-
ager deemed competent retains her job for the second period and may, in addition, have
the opportunity to acquire another firm. Managers are induced to exert effort explicitly
through performance-based compensation and implicitly through future private benefits.
Since managers enjoy more private benefits from running larger firms, acquisition oppor-
tunities provide (additional) incentives. This, in turn, mitigates moral hazard and the need
to offer performance-based compensation. Thus, the market for corporate control can ben-
efit shareholders even in the absence of disciplinary takeovers, that is, even if incompetent
managers are never retained.
This insight has implications for firms’ acquisition policies. When shareholders, or the
board of directors, on their behalf, decide on an acquisition budget, they face a trade-
off: On the one hand, more funds enable the manager to undertake an unprofitable, or
more unprofitable, takeover. On the other hand, a larger budget increases the chance of
making an acquisition and therefore provides more incentives. Due to the latter effect, the
optimal acquisition budget never permits only profitable acquisitions but always allows
for some unprofitable takeovers as well. Contrary to the literature on empire building ?,
in the present paper acquisitions are a remedy rather than a source of incentive problems.
Since our model assumes that shareholders can limit the acquisition budget, takeovers
against their best interest do not occur in equilibrium. Our model predicts an inverse
relation between (managerial discretion over) the acquisition budget and (performance-
based) CEO pay, and worse acquisition performances for firms with larger budgets.2
For the sake of clarity, we derive the acquisition opportunity effect in a simplified set-
ting in which disciplinary takeovers play no role since incompetent managers are always
dismissed by the board. To provide a more comprehensive analysis we extend the frame-
work in two ways: First, we let the firm choose the quality of its board, modelled as the
probability that an incompetent manager is dismissed by the board. Second, a firm can
be a potential acquirer or target, depending on its first-period performance. The takeover
market then plays a dual role in reducing moral hazard, rewarding successful managers
with acquisition opportunities and disciplining underperforming ones. We also explore the
interaction between takeover market and board quality. In our model, takeovers and boards
are substitutes with respect to dismissing poorly performing managers and jointly deter-
mine managerial turnover. More takeover pressure crowds out costly investment in board
quality, possibly even to the extent that it reduces overall turnover risk for managers.
Next, we show how governance externalities can arise through interactions in the
takeover market. To this end, we consider a large number of ex ante identical firms whose
role in the takeover market depends on their first-period cash flows. Poorly performing
2 ? finds that high-cash firms make more acquisitions than other firms and that those
acquisitions have lower announcement returns.
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firms become potential targets and well performing firms are potential acquirers. In equi-
librium, firms choose too much board quality and too small acquisition budgets. On the
one hand, each firm fails to internalize the fact that improvements in board quality reduce
the acquisition opportunities for other firms. On the other hand, each firm does not take
into account that a larger budget would strengthen the takeover threat to other firms and
discipline their managers.
In the last part of the paper we introduce a market for scarce managerial talent. After
the first period, a firm may poach a competent manager from another firm instead of
hiring a random replacement. Importantly, only firms with a functioning board, that is,
firms which have dismissed incompetent managers, can compete for managerial talent
since firms with failed internal governance do not dismiss their manager. The possibility
of poaching encourages investment in board quality because it increases the returns from
dismissing an incompetent manager. While this raises the demand for managerial talent,
it also reduces the supply of targets in the takeover market. Hence, the liquidity in the
takeover and managerial labour markets move in opposite directions. Finally, we show
that competition for managerial talent may lead to overinvestment in board quality and
reduce aggregate shareholder welfare. From a social planner’s perspective poaching is a
zero sum game since competent managers are equally productive in all firms.
Our paper is related to theoretical work on takeovers, boards of directors, and gov-
ernance spillovers. While takeovers are but a threat to incumbent managers in exist-
ing takeover models, we argue that they are also opportunities that offer implicit incen-
tives. The importance of implicit incentives was first recognized by ? and ?. Rather than
analysing CEO incentives driven by career concerns, we explore the incentive effect of
acquisition opportunities (and takeover threat). To fully exploit the implicit incentives of
acquisitions in our model, the manager must be given the discretion to also undertake some
loss-making acquisitions. This builds on the idea that managerial autonomy comes with
both costs and benefits, as in ?, ?, and ?. In these studies, discretion increases managerial
rents ex post, which in turn provide incentives ex ante. We employ the same trade-off and
implement managerial discretion through the budget policy. In contrast, ? and ? ensure
managerial discretion through partial ownership dispersion, whereas ? rely on weak boards
to commit to a lenient firing policy.3 In our model, board failure exacerbates the agency
conflict within the firm but creates an acquisition opportunity, thereby mitigating agency
problems in other firms.
Ferreira et al. (2011) also allow the takeover market to remove an incompetent manager
if the board fails to intervene; however, a takeover occurs in their model only if the stock
price is informative. This creates a link between stock price informativeness and board
monitoring which is the focus of their analysis. We abstract from information revealed
through stock prices. Our study further differs from that of Ferreira et al. (2011) by
exploring the dual role of takeovers, the joint impact of board dismissal and takeovers on
managerial turnover, and the interaction between takeover and managerial labour markets.
Finally, some recent papers study the interaction between firms’ choices of corporate
governance. ? and ? identify an externality that operates through the managerial labour
market. All firms, irrespective of whether governance fails or functions, compete for scarce
3 ? provide an alternative argument in favour of weak boards. In their model, the board
performs the dual role of monitoring and advising the CEO. Close board monitoring may
not be desirable, because it makes the manager reluctant to share private information,
thereby compromising the board’s advisory role.
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managerial talent at the initial hiring stage. To incentivize managers, firms with weaker
governance offer more generous compensation packages. To remain attractive employers,
other firms also must pay high(er) salaries. In equilibrium, firms underinvest in corporate
governance because they ignore the negative effect of weak governance on other firms’
profits. In our model, only firms with a functioning board can compete for managerial tal-
ent. The possibility of poaching increases the private returns from board interference. But
poaching has no social value since it is a zero sum game. On the contrary, by encouraging
further investment in board quality, competition for managerial talent reduces the liquid-
ity of the takeover market and diminishes acquisition opportunities. Hence, in equilibrium
firms overinvest in internal governance. ? explores governance spillovers in a setting where
relative performance evaluation provides incentives for managers to manipulate earnings.
Our model differs from his, since governance externality operates through the takeover
and the managerial labour markets rather than through relative performance evaluation.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the basic model.
Section 3 develops the acquisition opportunity effect. Section 4 analyses the interactions
between takeovers and board quality and their implications for CEO turnover and com-
pensation. Section 5 studies the link between firm governance arrangements and takeover
market outcome. The interaction between takeovers and managerial labour market is ex-
plored in Section 6. Concluding remarks are presented in Section 7. All mathematical
proofs are in the Appendix.
2. Model
We consider a moral hazard problem with two periods of production. A firm hires a
manager who is either competent or incompetent. As in ? or ?, the manager’s type θ ∈
{θ, θ¯} is initially unknown, even to her. All parties hold the common prior p ∈ (0, 1) that
the manager is competent (θ = θ¯). Everyone is risk neutral and there is no discounting.
Once hired, the manager chooses an unobservable effort e ∈ {el, eh}. She enjoys private
benefits Z1 if she exerts low effort (e = el). At the end of the first period, a cash flow
X1 ∈ {0, X
H
1
} is realized that is contractible and depends on both managerial ability and
effort. Let qi(θ) = Pr[X1 = X
H
1
| ei, θ] denote the probability of a high cash flow given
managerial ability θ and effort ei.
Assumption 1 ql(θ) = qh(θ) = ql(θ¯) = 0 and qh(θ¯) = 1.
A manager generates a high cash flow only if she works and is competent. A richer
technology where sometimes a competent manager fails despite high effort or an incom-
petent manager succeeds would not qualitatively change our results. Shareholders receive
the cash flow X1 net of any wage paid to the manager.
If the manager is retained after the first period, she receives private benefits Z2 > 0
and produces a second-period cash flow X2 ∈ {0, X
H
2
}, which only depends on her ability.
A competent manager produces X2 = X
H
2
, whereas an incompetent manager produces 0.
A retained manager finds a potential takeover target with probability χ, which she can
acquire if she has sufficient funds. (The parameter χ is for the time exogenous but will be
endogenized in Section 5.) The acquisition budget is part of the contract that the manager
accepts at the outset (see below). Following a successful bid, the manager enjoys additional
private benefits ∆Z2 > 0 from running a larger firm in the second period. Such private
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benefits can come in many guises. For instance, managers are able to foster their prestige
and influence through acquisitions. ? find that managers who undertake acquisitions are
more likely to become board members in other firms. ? show that firms which are close
to inclusion in the Fortune 500 ranking are significantly more likely to make acquisitions.
Their interpretation is that managers increase the size of their firms to enjoy the prestige
of being a Fortune 500 firm.
Let Xa
2
∈ {0, XH
2
} be the gross return to acquiring shareholders from a successful
takeover that is determined by the ability of their manager: If she is competent (θ = θ),
the gross return is XH
2
. If she is incompetent (θ = θ), the second-period cash flow is zero.
Hence, the firm simply doubles its scale with an acquisition. For simplicity, we abstract
from incentive or coordination problems in the acquisition process and assume a (for now
exogenous) purchase price P a ≤ XH
2
. Besides the price, a successful transaction imposes
a takeover (or retooling) cost c. The cost c is random and drawn from a commonly known
uniform distribution function F (c) on [0, c]; its realization is publicly observed prior to the
takeover bid. The purpose of the random cost is to introduce uncertainty about takeover
profitability, which is more convenient than letting the target cash flow be random for a
given managerial ability.
If the manager is dismissed at the end of the first period, a new manager of unknown
ability is hired and the expected second-period cash flow is pXH
2
. For simplicity, a newly
hired manager cannot undertake an acquisition. This assumption can be relaxed without
qualitatively affecting our results.
Throughout the paper, we assume that the board makes decisions on behalf of the
shareholders and does so in their best interest. At the hiring stage, the board offers the
manager a contract comprising a compensation scheme and an acquisition budget. The
compensation scheme stipulates payments to the manager contingent on the realized cash
flow. Since the manager takes no actions in the second period, there is no role for second-
period wage payments. Let (wH , wL) denote the payments in case of first-period success
or failure, neither of which can be negative.
The manager has complete discretion over the budget when attempting a takeover.
The budget is contingent on first-period performance. Let (LH , LL) be the non-negative
budgets in case of first-period success or failure, respectively. The manager can only carry
out a takeover if the budget covers the total acquisition cost c+ P a.4 Suggestive evidence
for the deliberate design of acquisition budgets is presented in ?, who study the influence
of acquisition opportunities on financial policies. Using firm location as a measure of
acquisition prospects, the authors find that firms located in industry clusters maintain
more financial slack.5
To sum up, the timing of the game is as follows: (i) The parties sign a contract
(wH , wL, LH , LL) and the manager chooses an unobservable effort level e ∈ {el, eh}. (ii)
First-period cash flow X1 ∈ {0, X
H
1
} is realized and publicly observed. (iii) The board
decides to retain or dismiss the manager. (iv) If retained, the manager finds a poten-
4 From the condition L ≥ c+ P a, it is clear that contracting on an acquisition budget is
equivalent to contracting on a cut-off rule for the cost c. More generally, we can allow the
parties to contract on all variables except for the effort choice.
5 Anecdotal evidence further supports the idea that firms choose to leave financial slack
to management for future acquisitions. In its 2012 annual report Cisco System, Inc. writes:
”We expect to make future acquisitions. (...) We believe that our strong cash and cash
equivalents and investment position allows us to use cash resources (...) for acquisitions.”
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tial takeover target with probability χ, in which case (c, P a) is publicly observed. (v) A
takeover may or may not occur and second-period cash flow is realized.
Finally, we want to ensure that shareholders always find it optimal to induce high effort.
Assumption 2 p
[
XH
1
+ (1− p)XH
2
]
≥ Z1.
High effort is surely in the shareholders’ interest if the disutility of the effort is smaller
than its expected benefits. A high effort not only is a prerequisite for a high cash flow in the
first period, but may also allow to infer the manager’s ability (whereas nothing is learned
if the manager exerts low effort). Hence, high effort increases the expected payoff in the
second-period by (1− p)XH
2
. The assumption is stricter than necessary, since it abstracts
from the manager’s future private benefits and the potential gains from an acquisition.
Reflecting the increased importance of transferable managerial skills, as opposed to firm-
specific human capital ?, competence in our model refers to general skills. If a manager
proved her competence in one firm, she can also successfully manage a target firm. This
modelling choice has two implications. First, it makes takeovers a more effective incen-
tive device, compared to a setting where managerial competence is firm-specific. Second,
competent managers with transferable skills are attractive to all firms that are currently
run by incompetent managers. In Section 6 we introduce a managerial labour market in
which firms can compete for competent managers.
3. Acquisitions and CEO Incentives
This section analyses the optimal compensation scheme and acquisition policy for a given
purchase price and probability of finding a potential target. To start with, suppose the
manager’s incentive compatibility constraint is satisfied. Given that the manager exerts
high effort, the first-period cash flow perfectly reveals her ability. Hence, the posterior
belief that the manager is competent p(X1) equals one following good performance and
zero following poor performance.
The firing decision after the first period influences firm value in two ways. It determines
the ability of the manager in the second period and thus X2 (ex post effect). In addition,
it affects the manager’s incentive to exert effort, because she receives private benefits
if retained (ex ante effect). It is straightforward to see that the optimal firing policy
is to dismiss the manager unless X1 = X
H
1
. An incompetent manager never produces
positive profits in the second period, whereas hiring a new manager generates expected
cash flow of pXH
2
.6 Furthermore, it is also optimal to punish poor performance from
an ex ante perspective. Given that poor performance triggers dismissal, the choice of
the corresponding budget LL is immaterial and is subsequently ignored. The only caveat
against retaining a successful manager is the risk that she will subsequently incur excessive
losses in an acquisition. Indeed, a manager always favours an acquisition because of the
additional private benefits ∆Z2. However, the board, on behalf of shareholders, can avoid
(very) poor acquisitions through a tight(er) acquisition budget.
A retained manager finds a target with probability χ. Provided that the acquisition
budget exceeds the total cost (LH ≥ c+ P
a), she purchases the target and gets additional
private benefits ∆Z2. Let ρ
a(LH) ≡ χF (LH − P
a) denote the probability that the man-
ager makes a successful acquisition and pia ≡ E[XH
2
− c− P a] denote the shareholders’
6 ? find that boards fire CEOs once they come to view them as incompetent.
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expected net profit from a takeover, given that the manager has found a target and has
sufficient funds.
Having established the optimal firing policy, we can derive the contract offered at the
outset of the game. By Assumption 2, shareholders find it optimal to induce high effort.
Since it is never beneficial to reward poor performance, wages are set to zero in case of a
low first-period cash flow (wL = 0). Hence, the shareholders’ expected payoff simplifies to
p
[
XH
1
− wH +X
H
2
+ ρa(LH)pi
a
]
+ (1− p)pXH
2
.
With probability p, the manager turns out to be competent and produces a first-period
profit of XH
1
net of her wage plus XH
2
in the second period. In addition, shareholders
receive an expected acquisition return ρa(LH)pi
a. With probability (1− p), the manager
is incompetent and the expected second-period cash flow under the newly hired manager
is pXH
2
. The manager’s incentive compatibility constraint is
p [wH + Z2 + ρ
a(LH)4Z2] ≥ Z1.
If the manager works and turns out to be competent, she receives expected private
benefits Z2 + ρ
a(LH)4Z2 in addition to her (non-negative) wage wH . Recall that the
manager does not know her own type when choosing her effort.
We assume that the manager has a reservation utility equal to zero. Together with
the assumption of a positive wage, this allows us to ignore her participation constraint. A
more general setting would allow for risk aversion and a positive outside option, which may
lead to a binding participation constraint. In this case, the optimal compensation scheme
would include a fixed payment in addition to the performance-based reward wH . While we
assume throughout that the participation constraint is slack, we henceforth interpret the
wage wH as the performance-based component of the compensation scheme rather than
the overall level.
Since the shareholders’ objective function is decreasing in wH , the above incentive
constraint determines the optimal wage unless the constraint wH ≥ 0 is binding. To focus
on the case where the incentive constraint is binding, we impose the following assumption:
Assumption 3 Z1 > p(1 +4)Z2.
Given that monetary incentives are necessary to ensure effort provision, the following
result holds.
Lemma 1. The optimal performance-based wage is
w˜H =
Z1
p
−
[
1 + ρa(L˜H)4
]
Z2 and w˜L = 0,
and the optimal acquisition budget for a successful manager is
L˜H = X
H
2
+4Z2.
Shareholders have two “currencies” to compensate the manager, money and future
private benefits. The wage is increasing in private benefits from shirking, whereas future
private benefits (∆Z2) serve as an implicit incentive to exert effort. In particular, the
takeover market provides incentives by offering additional private benefits with probability
ρa(L˜H) and thereby allows to lower the wage. This positive incentive effect arises because
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first-period success is a prerequisite for an acquisition. The optimal acquisition budget
corresponds to the shareholders’ maximum willingness to pay for a target. It equals the sum
of the shareholders’ gross return and the manager’s private benefits. From the shareholders’
perspective, the private benefits are a free by-product of an acquisition that can be used
to lower compensation. Hence, their willingness to pay for an acquisition increases one-for-
one with ∆Z2. If private benefits were random rather than deterministic, the shareholders’
willingness to pay for a target would still exceed their gross return XH
2
.
The above simple contract is not the unique way of eliciting effort, but there is no
other contract which implements effort at a lower expected cost. Even if we allowed for
more elaborate contracts, the wage w˜H remains optimal. For example, shareholders could
induce high effort at the same expected cost by combining the wage wH with an acquisi-
tion bonus or a second-period wage. However, shareholders cannot do better with such a
contract. Importantly, the optimal acquisition policy L˜H is unique and part of any opti-
mal contract irrespective of the compensation scheme. The intuition is that any optimal
contract fully exploits the fact that acquisitions create private benefits as a by-product
and thus incentivize the manager.7
Proposition 1. The market for corporate control provides managerial incentives even
in the absence of disciplinary takeovers.
The common view of takeovers emphasizes the benefits of contestability. For instance,
Jensen (1988) argues that (the prospects of) disciplinary takeovers reduce agency con-
flicts and improve performance. In the above setting, there is no need for an external
disciplinary mechanism since an incompetent manager is always dismissed by the board.
Still, the market for corporate control benefits shareholders by reducing agency costs
through acquisition opportunities. Compensation is decreasing in the acquisition proba-
bility ρa(L˜H) and in the private benefits from running a larger firm 4Z2. Hence, w˜H is
lower if a manager has more financial resources under her control.
The acquisition opportunity effect also arises in more general settings with possibly
binding outside options, since it relaxes both the incentive constraint and the participa-
tion constraint. Note that this does not hold for the disciplinary effect of takeovers. While
a stronger takeover threat provides additional incentives, it may violate the manager’s
participation constraint by reducing expected private benefits. Furthermore, the acqui-
sition opportunity effect is also more broadly applicable. The prospect of undertaking
other types of investments, such as green field or research and development, also provides
incentives as long as these investments are associated with private benefits.
Identifying empirically the acquisition opportunity effect is difficult, since it usually op-
erates jointly with the takeover threat effect. For instance, changes in state antitakeover
regulation affect both acquisition opportunities and takeover threat. Consequently, ob-
served changes in, say CEO pay, cannot easily be attributed to one or the other effect.
One fruitful way to disentangle the two effects may be to exploit geographical concentra-
tion of industries in different states. If an industry is concentrated in a state that passes
7 If the wage would be contingent on performance and acquisition, the budget XH
2
+4Z2
would also from the shareholders’ perspective be ex post optimal. With such a compensa-
tion scheme the manager’s wage is reduced by 4Z2 whenever an acquisition is made, and
an acquisition is ex post profitable as long as XH
2
+4Z2 ≥ P
a + c. Note, however, that
such a compensation scheme entails - rather unrealistically - an acquisition malus.
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an antitakeover law, acquisition opportunities are reduced for all firms, but especially so
for industry peers. Another approach to identifying the acquisition opportunity effect is
to study how CEO pay reacts when potential target firms adopt antitakeover provisions.8
An alternative to using antitakeover measures may be to follow the approach of ? who
classify CEOs by different management styles. Among others, they identify managers with
high levels of acquisition activity. Our model would predict that such managers should re-
ceive lower performance-based compensation in the early stages of their career relative to
other groups. Finally, an alternative is to explore settings other than the takeover market
where the “more general” acquisition opportunity effect may operate such as, for instance,
changed prospects for foreign direct investment due to deregulation in host countries.
From the shareholders’ perspective, the ex post optimal budget equals XH
2
and only
allows for profitable acquisitions. However, a more generous budget is in the shareholders’
best interest.
Proposition 2. The optimal acquisition budget also allows for ex post loss-making ac-
quisitions (L˜H > X
H
2
).
The optimal budget policy trades off the cost of a loss-making acquisition with the
benefit of lower incentive pay. Since both effects are proportional to the acquisition proba-
bility ρa(LH), L˜H does not depend on the acquisition probability. By taking future control
benefits into account, the model provides a novel rationale for loss-making acquisitions.9
Such losses are partly compensated by lower CEO pay. Rather than being a symptom of
weak corporate governance, acquisition losses are part of the optimal incentive scheme. As
the maximum possible acquisition loss is ∆Z2, Proposition 2 is meant to apply to those
acquisitions that result in relatively moderate losses to acquiring firms. It does not aim
to explain deals that entail significant losses, or “wealth destruction on a massive scale”
?. At the same time, losses are not an inevitable consequence of the budget policy. They
only occur ex post if the realized total cost c+ P a is larger than XH
2
and lower than L˜H .
It ought to be pointed out that loss-making acquisitions are not a necessary condition
for the acquisition opportunity effect (Proposition 1) to arise. Even if shareholders were
to only allow for ex post profitable acquisitions (L˜H = X
H
2
), the market for corporate
control still reduces agency conflicts through acquisition opportunities. However, such a
policy would not allow shareholders to fully exploit the ex ante gains from acquisitions.
Proposition 2 implies that expected acquisition returns and performance-based com-
pensation move in the same direction. An increase in 4Z2 lowers the wage and expected
acquisition returns. The latter follows because larger private benefits ∆Z2 increase the
probability of a loss-making acquisition as well as the loss acceptable to shareholders.
Supportive evidence for these predictions is provided by two studies: ? find a positive
relation between acquiring managers’ equity-based compensation and the stock price re-
action to acquisition announcements. ? document that banks whose CEOs have higher
pay-for-performance sensitivity are less likely to undertake value-reducing acquisitions.10
8 Admittedly, the adoption of antitakeover provisions is likely to affect not only the ac-
quisition opportunities of other firms but also their risk of becoming a target ?.
9 Alternative explanations include empire building ?, managerial overconfidence ?, and
envy ?.
10 An alternative interpretation of their finding is that CEO pay is linked to long-run
performance and thus depends on how well their acquisitions perform.
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To the extent that more performance-based compensation is also associated with a higher
level of compensation, the prediction regarding losses is also consistent with ?, who doc-
uments a negative relation between the level of compensation and acquisition losses.
The career concerns literature argues that future private benefits are positively cor-
related with the manager’s career horizon ?. The larger future private benefits of young
managers imply in our model that their salary is lower which is consistent with evidence
reported by ?. In addition, larger private benefits also translate into larger budgets for
young managers, which in turn raises their chances of acquiring another firm. ? documents
that firms’ acquisition propensity decreases with the age of the CEO.11
Once effort has been exerted, the board would not want to provide funds in excess ofXH
2
for an acquisition. Hence, a “wait-and-see”approach where the firm arranges acquisition
financing ex post fails to implement the optimal acquisition policy. To guarantee that the
manager can also undertake loss-making acquisitions, the board has to give her ex ante full
discretion over sufficient resources. This is accomplished through the budget which serves
as a commitment device. Note that the budget L˜H is renegotiation proof in the sense that
the manager cannot be bribed into accepting a lower acquisition budget ex post. Since a
takeover occurs if and only if XH
2
+4Z2 ≥ P
a + c, the budget maximizes the joint payoff
of manager and (acquiring) shareholders. Hence, there is no scope for renegotiation.
The optimal budget policy can be implemented through the firm’s financial structure.
The firm always has sufficient funding or debt capacity to finance the acquisition budget
L˜H . Indeed, the total pledgeable income with an acquisition is 2X
H
2
+XH
1
and the budget
is L˜H = X
H
2
+∆Z2. From Assumptions 2 and 3 it follows that X
H
1
+XH
2
is larger than
∆Z2 which in turn ensures that 2X
H
2
+XH
1
is larger than XH
2
+∆Z2. There are different
ways to implement the budget L˜H . If the intermediate income is low (X
H
1
− w˜H < L˜H),
implementation requires additional funds beyond those generated internally. For example,
at the hiring stage the firm can obtain a non-revocable credit line, amounting to L˜H −X
H
1
,
in combination with a commitment to leave the intermediate income in the firm. Indeed,
chief financial officers consider funding certainty for acquisitions one of the main purposes
of credit lines ?. Instead of using a credit line, the board can ex ante endow the manager
with cash reserves or other liquid assets of the same amount. Conversely, if the intermediate
income is larger than the optimal budget (L˜H < X
H
1
− w˜H), funds must be pumped out of
the firm to prevent the manager from incurring excessive acquisition losses. For instance,
short-term debt of XH
1
− L˜H − wH can reduce the resources under the manager’s control.
4. Board Interference, Takeovers and CEO Turnover
This section extends the model in two ways to allow for the possibility of both internal
governance failure and disciplinary takeovers. First, the firm now chooses the quality of
its internal governance. Only with functioning internal governance will the board dismiss
a poorly performing manager. Second, disciplinary takeovers may step in when internal
governance fails and remove a poorly performing manager. As shown in the Internet
Appendix, Part A, the same qualitative results obtain if firms with functioning internal
governance can be takeover targets as well.
11 According to ?, the documented age effect cannot be explained by the selection of young
CEOs by acquisition-prone firms, or by the effect of time-invariant CEO characteristics
that may be cross-sectionally correlated with age.
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Like ?, we model internal governance as choosing the probability that the board is
able to dismiss the manager or not. Let τ ∈ [0, 1] be the probability that the firm’s
internal governance is functioning, in which case the board can replace the manager at
the interim date. Internal governance breaks down with probability (1− τ ), in which case
board dismissal never occurs. The state of internal governance is realized and becomes
observable at the end of the first period. Before hiring the manager, shareholders choose
the probability τ at a cost of internal governance K(τ ) = 1
2
kτ 2 with k > 0. We refer to
the ex ante choice of τ as board quality. We use the terms “failed board” or “failed gov-
ernance” interchangeably to refer to the ex post state when the board cannot intervene.
Similarly, we use the terms “functioning board” or “functioning governance” to describe
the ex post state when the board can dismiss the manager. To ensure an interior solution
for the choice of board quality we impose a lower bound on the governance cost parameter.
Assumption 4 k ≥ pZ2 + (1− p)pX
H
2
.
The cost K(τ ) can be interpreted literally as the resources spent on evaluating manage-
rial performance (e.g., by installing a transparent accounting system). Strictly speaking,
evaluating managerial performance is trivial in our setting because the simplifying As-
sumption 1 implies that first-period cash flow reveals in equilibrium managerial ability.
However, our results also obtain in a richer framework where cash flow is a noisy signal,
and performance evaluation would be non-trivial and costly. Alternatively, K(τ ) can be
understood as a measure of the conflict of interest between the board and shareholders.
Failure to dismiss a poorly performing manager may be due to board members’ lack of
independence, excessive workload, or simply the desire to avoid conflicts. A positive gov-
ernance cost captures in reduced form the notion that board compensation and other
incentive schemes cannot fully resolve the conflict of interest.
θ = θ¯
θ = θ
p
1− p
XH1
0
e = 1
e = 0
Potential Acquirer
XH2 + pi
a
XH2
ρa
1− ρa
0
0
e = 0
e = 1
τ
1− τ
Functioning Board
Potential Target
pXH2
P t
0
ρt
1− ρt
Figure 1. Event Tree.
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Clearly, the quality of the board only matters if the firm performs poorly. Given that
the manager works (e = 1), the firm performs poorly and internal governance fails with
probability (1− p)(1− τ ). In this case an acquirer shows up with probability ρt and offers
to purchase the firm for a (for now exogenous) price P t. We assume that this price is
positive, implying that target shareholders always accept the offer. The target manager
loses her position in the takeover.12 With probability (1− p)τ the firm is poorly performing
but internal governance is functioning. In this case the board dismisses the manager and
a takeover never occurs. To highlight the incentive effects of takeovers, we also rule out
the possibility that a firm with a high first-period cash flow can be acquired.13 Therefore,
the outcome for well performing firms remains unchanged: The manager is retained and
makes an acquisition with probability ρa(LH). The extended model thus encompasses the
base model as a special case with flawless internal governance (k = 0 and τ = 1) and no
takeover threat (ρt = 0). Figure 1 presents the event tree of our game.
We abstract from severance payments that are meant to induce incompetent managers
to voluntarily leave.14 Introducing severance pay for voluntary departure would not quali-
tatively affect our results. Its primary impact would be to increase expected second-period
cash flow whenever both governance mechanisms fail to remove an incompetent manager.
However, severance pay would not affect managerial incentives to exert effort because it
substitutes expected private benefits with expected cash payments. Furthermore, neither
internal governance nor disciplinary takeovers would be redundant as they reduce the need
to offer costly severance pay.
We now solve for the optimal contract in the extended game. Since a poorly performing
manager may escape dismissal, setting LL equal to zero prevents her from making an ac-
quisition. Given that it remains optimal to never reward failure (wL = 0), the shareholders’
maximization problem of the extended game is
max
wH ,LH ,τ
p
[
XH
1
−wH +X
H
2
+ ρa(LH)pi
a
]
+ (1− p)[τpXH
2
+ (1− τ )ρtP t]−
1
2
kτ 2
subject to the incentive constraint
p [wH + Z2 + ρ
a(LH)4Z2] + (1− p)(1− τ )(1− ρ
t)Z2
≥ Z1 + (1− τ )(1− ρ
t)Z2
and the constraints
wH ≥ 0 and τ ∈ [0, 1].
The manager can now receive the private benefits Z2 despite poor performance when
both internal and external governance mechanisms fail (which happens with probability
(1− τ )(1− ρt)).
12 Increased managerial turnover in target firms after the takeover has been documented
by several studies (???).
13 Arguably, mergers among successful firms are likely to be (more) incentive neutral.
Indeed, such mergers will not affect incentives in our model if each manager is equally
likely to become CEO of the combined firm, implying a gain of ∆Z2, as to be demoted to
divisional manager, implying a loss of −∆Z2 private benefits.
14 Severance pay in the case of forced departure would merely harden the manager’s in-
centive compatibility constraint and accordingly reduce the shareholders’ expected payoff.
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Lemma 2. The optimal performance-based wage is
w∗H =
Z1
p
−
[
τ ∗ + ρt(1− τ ∗) + ρa(L∗H)4
]
Z2 and w
∗
L = 0, (1)
the optimal acquisition budget is
L∗H = X
H
2
+4Z2 and L
∗
L = 0, (2)
and the optimal board quality is
τ ∗ =
1
k
{
p(1− ρt)Z2 + (1− p)[pX
H
2
− ρtP t]
}
. (3)
The firm now has three means at its disposal to incentivize the manager. It can of-
fer a monetary reward for good performance, provide funds for future acquisitions, and
choose the quality of the board which translates into a dismissal threat following poor per-
formance. Since the modifications only pertain to the contingency of poor performance,
the optimal acquisition budget for competent managers remains unchanged. In contrast,
internal governance failure now becomes a possibility due to the governance cost (As-
sumption 4). That is, the optimal board quality in equation (??) is strictly less than one.
Performance-based compensation is decreasing with the implicit incentives embedded in
the acquisition opportunities and dismissal risk. The overall dismissal risk comprises the
probability of being dismissed by the board, τ ∗, and the risk of being taken over in case of
internal governance failure, ρt(1− τ ∗). Thus, the takeover market plays now a dual role,
rewarding performing managers with acquisition opportunities and disciplining the others.
Both effects work in the same direction and lower performance-based pay.
Better board quality adds value by relaxing the incentive constraint. The expected
pay reduction due to the threat of board dismissal is reflected in the term p(1− ρt)Z2 in
equation (??). In addition, board dismissal of incompetent managers affects future cash
flow. The effect is captured in the second term of equation (??): Upon poor performance,
expected second-period cash flow is pXH
2
with a functioning board and ρtP t in case
of an internal governance failure. Optimal board quality increases with the manager’s
private benefits Z2, since the dismissal threat becomes a more effective means for lowering
managerial pay. Higher future cash flow XH
2
and lower governance cost k also increase
board quality. Higher board quality in turn reduces CEO compensation. ? finds that
CEO performance-based pay in the United States is indeed lower in firms with higher
board quality. In addition, ? document that pay-for-performance sensitivity in real estate
organizations is much higher for managers who face lower dismissal threats.
Intuitively a more active takeover market discourages investment in board quality for
two reasons:15 First, the takeover threat obviates the board’s disciplinary role. Second,
the prospect of selling the firm reduces the benefits of having a functioning board.
Even though a functioning board and takeovers are substitutes, a greater takeover risk
does not necessarily increase managerial turnover due to two opposing effects: On the one
hand, it makes it more likely that the manager is removed through a takeover when internal
15 ? analyse theoretically the relationship between board dismissals and takeovers. ? find
that firms with strong boards are more likely to have corporate charter provisions that
impede takeovers. ? also provide evidence of the substitutability between takeovers and
internal governance. The authors find that takeovers increase the dismissal risk for poor
performance only in firms with weak (insider-dominated) boards.
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governance fails. On the other hand, greater takeover pressure discourages investment in
board quality, thereby indirectly lowering the dismissal threat. The relative strength of
the two effects depends on the board quality. To distinguish between strong and weak
boards we define the threshold level k = 2[pZ2 + (1− p)pX
H
2
].
Proposition 3. In firms with strong boards (k ≤ k), managerial turnover following poor
performance is first decreasing and then increasing in the intensity of the takeover threat.
If the board is strong and the takeover threat is low, internal governance failure is
very unlikely. Hence, the (positive) direct effect of an increase in ρt on turnover risk is
negligible and its (negative) effect on board incentives dominates. That is, overall turnover
risk is decreasing in the takeover threat. Once the takeover threat is sufficiently large, its
negative effect on board incentives is unimportant since the takeover market is likely to
intercede.16 In the case of high governance costs (k > k), an increase in ρt always raises
the overall dismissal risk since board quality is anyhow low.
Proposition 3 is supported by ? who document that the sensitivity of CEO turnover
to performance increases following the adoption of antitakeover legislation in firms with
strong boards. Similarly, ? find increased frequencies of forced turnovers in the 1990s
relative to the 1980s, despite the decline in hostile takeover activity.
5. Market Outcome and Externality
This section goes beyond the single-firm partial equilibrium analysis and explores how
firms’ governance choices affect the outcome in the takeover market. We consider a con-
tinuum of ex ante identical firms with unit mass and a sufficiently large pool of managers
who all play the game of the previous section. That is, firms simultaneously choose the
quality of their board and then agree with a manager on performance-based pay and an
acquisition budget. The probability of hiring a competent manager is p and independent
across firms. After the managers’ effort choices, first-period cash flows realize, board (non-
)interference takes place, and the takeover market opens. While we continue to assume
that only poorly performing firms with failed governance are potential targets, we show
in the Internet Appendix, Part B, that the same qualitative results obtain if all poorly-
performing firms can be targets. As before, LL = 0 ensures that incompetent managers
who escape being replaced cannot undertake an acquisition. Therefore, the proportions of
potential acquirers and targets in equilibrium are p and (1− p)(1− τ ), respectively.
We assume that the takeover market is plagued by frictions such that both ρa and ρt
are always smaller than one. Besides being plausible, this assumption allows us to work
with formal expressions that are independent of which side of the market is the short
one.17 To this end, we impose the following matching technology. Firms are uniformly
distributed on a circle. After the first period, an acquirer can only bid for the neighbouring
firm to its right, if that firm is a target, that is, both poorly performing and with failed
16 From the optimal wage equation (??) it follows that if turnover is non-monotonic in
takeover pressure, so is performance-based compensation.
17 Our qualitative results, notably market externalities, do not rely on frictions, provided
that each target (acquirer) does not keep being matched with acquirers (targets) until a
favourable takeover cost is realized.
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governance. The transaction price corresponds to a takeover premium that is equal to a
fraction λ ∈ [0, 1] of the gross takeover surplus.18 That is, P = λXH
2
.
A firm’s takeover probabilities ρa and ρt now depend on the acquisition policies, gover-
nance choices and first-period performances of other firms. Let L̂H and τ̂ be the acquisition
budget (following success) and board quality of the representative firm in the economy,
respectively. Then the probability that a firm is taken over following poor performance
and internal governance failure is
ρt(L̂H) = pF (L̂H − P ). (4)
It simply equals the probability that the neighbouring manager to the left turns out
to be competent and has sufficient funds (LH > c+ P ). Importantly, the probability of
being taken over increases in the acquisition budget of the representative firm, L̂H . The
probability that a successful manager can acquire the rival firm is
ρa(τˆ) = (1− p)(1− τˆ)F (LH − P ). (5)
While the risk of being taken over depends on the other firms’ acquisition budget, the
chance of taking over another firm, ρa, depends on the governance quality in other firms
τ̂ . The probability of making an acquisition is decreasing in τ̂ . Thus, a successful manager
is less likely to face a potential target if board quality in other firms increases.
It can easily be checked that there exists a unique, symmetric equilibrium in which all
firms choose the same wage, budget and board quality. The equilibrium coincides with
the solution to the single-firm problem in Lemma 2 with the one, crucial difference that
the takeover probabilities are now endogenous. That is, ρt∗(L∗H) and ρ
a∗(τ ∗) are given by
equations (??) and (??).
The equilibrium acquisition budget is
L∗H = X
H
2
+∆Z2. (6)
As discussed earlier, the trade-off that determines the optimal budget is independent of
the takeover probabilities and thus of the actions in other firms. In particular, a firm’s
budget is independent of the level of board quality in other firms. As in the single-firm
case, the equilibrium budget allows for some loss-making acquisitions.
In equilibrium, all firms choose the same board quality:
τ ∗ =
1
k
{
p(1− ρt∗)Z2 + (1− p)
[
pXH
2
− ρt∗P
]}
(7)
Note that a firm’s choice of board quality is affected by the budget policy of the represen-
tative firm through ρt. A reduction in the takeover probability - due to higher expected
takeover costs - increases the equilibrium level of board quality.
The equilibrium performance-based wage is
w∗H =
Z1
p
−
[
τ ∗ + ρt∗(1− τ ∗) + ρa∗4
]
Z2. (8)
Compensation depends on both the budget policy and board quality in other firms through
the takeover probabilities. If other firms have more financial slack, they pose a greater
takeover threat which lowers compensation. Better board quality in other firms diminishes
acquisition opportunities and thus necessitates higher performance-based pay. Moreover,
18 The same qualitative results obtain for alternative price functions, for instance a
takeover premium based on the net rather than the gross surplus.
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the other firms’ budget policy has an indirect effect on compensation since it also alters
the optimal level of board quality. Larger acquisition budgets in other firms raise the
takeover threat which discourages investments in board quality and thereby drives up
compensation.
We now turn to the socially optimal outcome. The social planner is assumed to choose
wages, acquisition budget, and board quality to maximize shareholder wealth while ab-
stracting from managers’ payoffs.19 Let E[XH
2
− c] denote the expected net surplus con-
ditional on the occurrence of a takeover.
Lemma 3. The socially optimal performance-based wage is
woH =
Z1
p
−
[
τ o + ρt
o
(1− τ o) + ρa
o
4
]
Z2 and w
o
L = 0, (9)
the socially optimal acquisition budget is
LoH = X
H
2
+4Z2 +
p
1− p
Z2 + P and L
o
L = 0, (10)
and the socially optimal board quality is
τ o =
1
k
{
p(1− ρt
o
)Z2 + p
δρa
o
δτˆ
∆Z2 + (1− p)
[
pXH
2
− ρt
o
E[XH
2
− c]
]}
(11)
where ρto and ρao are given by equations (??) and (??).
We discuss the solution to the social planner’s optimization problem while comparing it
to the equilibrium outcome in equations (??), (??), and (??). Since firms fail to internalize
the impact of their budget and governance choices on other firms, the equilibrium outcome
is not (constrained) efficient:
Proposition 4. In equilibrium, acquisition budgets are too small (L∗H < L
o
H) and board
quality is too high (τ o < τ ∗).
The difference between the socially optimal and the equilibrium acquisition budget is
the third term in equation (??), p
1−p
Z2 + P . Equilibrium acquisition budgets are too low
for two reasons: First, firms do not take into account the fact that (larger) budgets have
a positive externality, since they increase the takeover threat for incompetent managers
and thus reduce incentive pay in all firms. This externality is reflected in the term p
1−p
Z2.
Second, acquiring firms appropriate only part of the takeover gains and therefore provide
too little funding. That is, they ignore the payoff P that accrues to target shareholders.
Only if all takeover gains accrue to the acquiring firm (P = 0) and the takeover threat
plays no disciplinary role (Z2 = 0), will the equilibrium budget in equation (??) coincide
with the socially optimal one in equation (??). While equilibrium budgets also allow for
some loss-making acquisition, acquisition policies are not permissive enough because firms
ignore that higher budgets also discipline managers in other firms.
19 If the welfare function included managerial rents, the social planner would be biased
towards using compensation, since both internal governance and takeovers engender a
deadweight loss.
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Firms choose in equilibrium too high board quality due to three effects: First, firms
fail to internalize that higher board quality diminishes acquisition opportunities for other
firms. This effect is captured by the term p δρ
a
o
δτˆ
∆Z2 in equation (??). Second, equilibrium
board quality compensates for the inefficiently low takeover threat, caused by too small
acquisition budgets. Third, equilibrium board quality balances the stand-alone value pX2H
with the target’s private return from a takeover P whereas the social planner considers
the expected total net surplus E[XH
2
− c].
The equilibrium wage may be larger or smaller than the wage associated with the
socially optimal board quality and budget. While too small budgets increase the wage,
too high board quality can increase or decrease performance-based compensation relative
to its socially optimal level. Board quality increases the dismissal threat while diminishing
acquisition opportunities. Consequently, the overall effect is unclear.
Proposition 4 underlines the social value of a liquid takeover market. More generous
budgets enhance the supply of acquiring firms. In turn, lower board quality creates a
more liquid takeover market by increasing the supply of potential target firms. However,
the liquidity of the takeover market is a public good and is therefore underprovided in
equilibrium.
Corollary 1. In equilibrium, the incidence of takeovers is too low from a social perspec-
tive.
Shleifer and Summers (1988) propose that takeover activity may be too high because it
can lead to a breach of implicit contracts between shareholders and different stakeholders
whereby the former deprive the latter of their rents. This breach can limit contracting
opportunities and decrease ex ante welfare. In contrast, firms are not acquisitive enough
in our setting. Acquirers create a positive externality because the takeover threat miti-
gates moral hazard. The externality operates across rather than within firms. ? provide
an alternative argument for why there may be too few takeovers. They propose that a
founder may choose an excessively dispersed ownership structure in order to extract a
larger fraction of a future acquirer’s surplus. Free-riding behaviour by small sharehold-
ers strengthens the bargaining position of the target. In our setting, target firms stifle
takeover activity through excessive board quality rather than free-riding behaviour. The
inefficiency is not driven by an attempt to extract surplus from the acquirer but due to
the failure to take the externality on other managers’ incentives into account.
Our result that firms overinvest in board quality refers to the monitoring role of the
board and its ability to dismiss a poorly performing manager. Proposition 4 does not apply
to other measures of governance quality, notably not to antitakeover devices, like the GIM
index ? or the E-index ?. The common criticism holds that such devices entrench incum-
bent managers, thereby exacerbating agency conflicts in (target) firms. In our framework,
takeover defences are also detrimental because they preclude value-enhancing takeovers.
In addition, our analysis provides a novel argument against antitakeover provisions: They
reduce acquisition opportunities, and therefore force firms to offer their managers higher
incentive pay.20
20 For the same reason, the presence of leveraged buyout funds can be detrimental for
public firms: They deprive managers of acquisition opportunities, though they also exert
disciplinary pressure on managers of poorly performing firms.
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6. Takeovers and Managerial Labour Market
In this section we introduce a market for scarce managerial talent. After firing the manager,
a firm with a functioning board may now poach a manager from another firm instead
of hiring a random replacement. All other features of the model remain the same. In
particular, a manager of a firm with a governance failure can only be removed through
a takeover. Clearly, in equilibrium a firm would never poach a manager that performed
poorly before. Only proven, competent managers receive outside offers. Also, a firm has no
incentive to replace a manager that proved her competence through first-period success.
Therefore, the fraction of firms demanding a new manager is (1− p)τˆ and the fraction of
firms supplying the labour market is p.
To keep the analysis of takeover and managerial labour markets tractable, we consider
the following matching technology. As in Section 5, all firms are uniformly distributed
along a circle, and a firm can only bid for the neighbouring firm to its right. In addition,
a firm can now try to hire the manager of the neighbouring firm to its left. A poorly
performing firm is therefore either a potential takeover target or a potential poacher, but
is never simultaneously in both markets. The dichotomy between the takeover and labour
market simplifies the analysis as it rules out the possibility that a target poaches the
manager of its potential acquirer.
Consider firm i and its left-sided neighbour firm j at the interim date and suppose
that firm i performed poorly in the first period. If neighbouring manager j performed
successfully, there are two mutually exclusive possibilities, depending on the state of firm
i’s governance. On the one hand, if firm i experiences a governance failure, it might be
acquired by firm j. On the other hand, if its internal governance is functioning, firm i
may try to poach manager j. It does so by offering a wage wˆP to the manager. With
probability 1− µ poaching is successful and the net return to shareholders of firm i in the
second period is XH
2
− wˆP . Like the newly hired manager in Sections 4 and 5, the poached
manager cannot undertake an acquisition. Firm j replaces its lost competent manager
with a new manager of unknown quality. With probability µ poaching fails. In this case,
manager j stays with her initial firm and receives a second-period wage wˆ in addition to
the private benefits. Firm i randomly hires a new manager of unknown quality. We do not
pin down the wages wˆP and wˆ but just assume that both satisfy the relevant participation
constraints. Finally, if firm j is poorly performing or firm i is well-performing, the two
firms do not interact with one another, though they may interact with their respective
other neighbour.
Lemma 4. In equilibrium, the ex ante identical firms choose the performance-based wage
w∗∗H =
Z1
p
−
[
τ ∗∗ + ρt∗∗(1− τ ∗∗) + ρa∗∗4
]
Z2 − (1− p)τ
∗∗(µwˆ + (1− µ)wˆP ) and w∗∗L = 0,
(12)
the acquisition budget
L∗∗H = X
H
2
+4Z2 and L
∗∗
L = 0, (13)
and the board quality
τ ∗∗ =
1
k
{p(1− ρt∗∗)Z2 + (1− p)[pX
H
2
+ p(1− µ)(XH
2
(1− p)− wˆP )− ρt∗∗P ]}, (14)
where ρt∗∗ and ρa∗∗ are given by equations (??) and (??).
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The introduction of the managerial labour market mainly affects the chosen level of
board quality in equation (??). Board quality is higher with an active labour market due
to the possibility of poaching a competent manager. The term p(1− µ)(XH
2
(1− p)− wˆP )
on the right hand side in (??) captures this additional effect: With probability p(1− µ)
the neighbouring manager is competent and poaching is successful, which generates an
additional return of (XH
2
(1− p)− wˆP ) relative to a random outside hire.
The first-period wage in equation (??) is lower than the equilibrium wage in Section
5. The prospect of being poached incentivizes managers to exert effort and allows share-
holders to reduce the performance-based pay w∗∗H . The effect is captured by the term
(1− p)τ ∗∗(µwˆ + (1− µ)wˆP ) in equation (??): With probability (1− p)τ ∗∗, a successful
manager is poached by the neighbouring firm, in which case she receives an expected
wage (µwˆ + (1− µ)wˆP ). Shareholders can fully offset this increase in expected future
compensation by lowering the wage w∗∗H , while maintaining incentive compatibility (be-
cause first-period success is a prerequisite for being poached). As a consequence, managers’
expected total pay does not change with an active labour market.
It can easily be checked that the socially optimal outcome is unaffected by the introduc-
tion of a labour market and coincides with Lemma 3. The intuition is that competition for
managers is a zero sum game: The supply of competent managers is fixed and the labour
market reallocates a fraction 1− µ of talented managers without affecting aggregate cash
flow. Given that equilibrium board quality in (??) increases compared to Section 5 while
the socially optimal level remains the same, the overall effect is a reduction in shareholder
wealth. We summarize the above discussion in:21
Proposition 5. Competition for managerial talent increases equilibrium board quality
and reduces shareholder welfare.
? also study the relationship between competition for managerial talent and corporate
governance. Their setup differs from ours in two key respects. First, in the present paper
only firms with a functioning board compete for scarce managerial talent, whereas in
Acharya and Volpin all firms do, irrespective of whether governance fails or functions.
Consequently, competition for talent does not increase the returns to board intervention.
Second, talent is scarce at the initial hiring stage in Acharya and Volpin and the ex ante
wage is the outcome of a bargaining game. In contrast, firms in our model compete for
talent only at the interim date and the ex ante wage is solely determined by the incentive
compatibility constraint. That is, the prospect of being poached at the interim date raises
the manager’s future compensation but lowers her first-period wage.
Due to these differences in the setup, competition for managerial talent has opposing
effects on the choice of governance and the equilibrium distortion. In Acharya and Volpin
more competition for talent, i.e., more poaching, discourages board interference. It im-
proves the bargaining position of the manager which limits the extent to which sharehold-
ers can lower her compensation through better governance. Moreover, firms underinvest in
governance in equilibrium because they ignore a positive effect on other firms’ profits: A
manager’s bargaining position depends on the compensation she can receive at other firms,
which in turn depends on those firms’ governance choices. As a consequence, stronger gov-
ernance reduces compensation not only for the own manager but also for other managers
21 Proposition 5 also holds if all poorly-performing firms can be taken over (see Part C
of the Internet Appendix).
20 M. Burkart and K. Raff
due to diminished outside options. In contrast, more poaching raises board quality in our
model, since it increases the expected returns from dismissing an incompetent manager.
However, there are no corresponding social returns. In equilibrium there is overinvestment
in board quality because competent managers are equally productive in all firms.
Corollary 2. In equilibrium, when poaching becomes more profitable, the liquidity in the
takeover market decreases.
Poaching becomes more profitable if the success probability 1− µ increases or if the
poaching wage wˆP decreases. In either case, the benefits of a functioning board increase
which raises equilibrium board quality τ ∗∗ in equation (??). While higher board quality
increases the demand for managerial talent, it reduces the supply of targets in the takeover
market. Hence, the liquidity in the takeover and managerial labour markets are inversely
related.
7. Conclusion
Previous research on the incentive implications of takeovers has focussed on the threat
of being taken over and its effect on managerial behaviour. We argue that the takeover
market also mitigates agency conflicts by providing acquisition opportunities for success-
ful managers. As a consequence, takeovers may benefit shareholders even if they do not
play any disciplinary role or generate any synergies. At the same time, takeover pressure
stifles a board’s incentive to discipline management, possibly to the extent that it aggra-
vates agency conflicts in target firms. A liquid takeover market with a sufficient supply of
potential targets and acquirers constitutes a public good that provides implicit incentives
to all managers in the economy. In equilibrium, externality in governance choices across
firms arises. The quality of internal governance, which reduces the scope for acquisitions,
is excessive and acquisition budgets are too small. As a consequence, takeover activity is
inefficiently low. Finally, a more active managerial labour market reduces activity in the
takeover market. When poaching becomes more profitable, firms increase board quality.
While this raises the demand for managerial talent, it also reduces the supply of targets
in the takeover market.
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8. Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1 . Assumption 3 implies that the incentive compatibility constraint
is binding which in turn determines w˜H . Substituting w˜H in the objective function yields
the following simplified program
max
LH
p
[
XH
1
− (Z1/p− [1 + ρ
a(LH)4]Z2) +X
H
2
+ ρa(LH)pi
a
]
+ (1− p)pXH
2
with the first order condition
pχf4Z2 + pχ(X
H
2
− LH)f = 0 ⇔ L˜H = X
H
2
+4Z2.

Proof of Lemma 2 . As in Lemma 1, the incentive compatibility constraint determines
the wage w∗H . Substituting w
∗
H in the objective function yields the following program
max
LH ,τ
p
[
XH
1
−
(
Z1/p− [τ + (1− τ )ρ
t + ρa(LH)4]Z2
)
+XH
2
+ ρa(LH)pi
a
]
+(1− p)
[
τpXH
2
+ (1− τ )ρtP t
]
−
1
2
kτ 2
The first order conditions with respect to LH and τ give equations (??) and (??). 
Proof of Proposition 3 . Let us define overall turnover risk conditional upon poor
first-period performance as
Γ∗ ≡ τ ∗ + (1− τ ∗)ρt
Differentiating the overall turnover risk Γ∗ with respect to ρt yields
∂Γ∗
∂ρt
= 1− τ ∗ + (1− ρt)
∂τ ∗
∂ρt
= 1− (1− ρt)
2
k
[
pZ2 + (1− p)pX
H
2
]
Hence, for k > k = 2[pZ2 + (1− p)pX
H
2
], ∂Γ∗/∂ρt > 0 for all ρt. For k ≤ k, ∂Γ∗/∂ρt ≥ 0,
provided that ρt ≥ ρt(k) = 1− k/2[pZ2 + (1− p)pX
H
2
], and ∂Γ∗/∂ρt < 0 otherwise (ρt <
ρt). 
Proof of Lemma 3 . The social planner solves the following program
max
wH ,τˆ ,LˆH
p

XH1 − wH +XH2 + (1− p)(1− τ̂ )
LˆH−P∫
0
(XH
2
− P − c)f(c)dc


+(1− p)
[
τˆ pXH
2
+ (1− τˆ)ρt(L̂H)P
]
−
1
2
kτˆ 2
subject to
wH ≥
Z1
p
−
[
τˆ + (1− τˆ )ρt(L̂H) + ∆ρ
a(τ̂)
]
Z2
and wH ≥ 0 and τˆ ∈ [0, 1].
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As in Lemmata 1 and 2, the binding incentive compatibility constraint determines woH
in equation (??). The first order condition with respect to τˆ gives equation (??). The first
order condition with respect to LH is
−p
∂woH
∂LH
+ p(1− p)(1− τˆ )(XH
2
− LH)f(c) + (1− p)p(1− τˆ)Pf(c) = 0
⇔ LoH = X
H
2
+∆Z2 + P +
p
1− p
Z2
It can easily be verified that the optimization program is concave, that is, the Hessian
matrix is negative semi-definite. 
Proof of Proposition 4 . The difference between the equilibrium acquisition budget
in equation (??) and the socially optimal acquisition budget in equation (??) is
L∗H − L
o
H = −∆Z2 − P −
p
1− p
Z2
which is negative. The difference between the equilibrium board quality in equation (??)
and the socially optimal board quality in equation (??) is
τ ∗ − τ o =
1
k
[
p[ρto − ρt∗]Z2 − p
δρao
δτ o
∆Z2 + (1− p)[ρ
toE[XH
2
− c]− ρt∗P ]
]
The first term in squared brackets on the right hand side, p[ρto − ρt∗]Z2, is positive since
LoH > L
∗
H . The second term is negative because
δρao
δτo
is negative for all τ . Hence, it suffices
to verify that the last term in brackets on the right hand side, [ρtoE[XH
2
− c]− ρt∗P ], is
positive. Recall that E[XH
2
− c] is the expected surplus conditional on the occurence of a
takeover. We thus obtain
[ρtoE[XH
2
− c]− ρt∗P ] = p[
Lo
H
−P∫
0
(XH
2
− c)f(c)dc− F (L∗H − P )P ].
To sign the above expression, note that it is strictly decreasing in P and obtains a minimum
when P = 1
2
L∗H . It can easily be verified that the above expression is positive at P =
1
2
L∗H
which implies that τ ∗ > τ o. 
Proof of Lemma 4 . The shareholders’ maximization problem is
max
wH ,LH ,τ
p
[
XH
1
− wH + (1− p)τ̂ [µ(X
H
2
− wˆ) + (1− µ)(pXH
2
)]
]
+p

(1− p)(1− τ̂ )[XH2 +
LˆH−P∫
0
(XH
2
− P − c)f(c)dc]


+(1− p)[τ̂(µpXH
2
+ (1− µ)(XH
2
− wˆP )) + (1− τ̂)ρt(LˆH)P ]−
1
2
kτ̂ 2
subject to the incentive constraint
p
[
wH + Z2 + ρ
a(LˆH)4Z2 + (1− p)τ̂(µwˆ + (1− µ)wˆ
P )
]
+ (1− p)(1− τ̂)(1− ρt(LˆH))Z2
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≥ Z1 + (1− τ )(1− ρ
t(LˆH))Z2
and the constraints
wH ≥ 0 and τ̂ ∈ [0, 1].
As in Lemmata 1 to 3, the binding incentive compatibility constraint determines w∗∗H .
The first order conditions with respect to LH and τ give equations (??) and (??). 
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